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EMPLOYER NEUTRALITY AS HOT CARGO:




This Article is about the manufacture of labor policy at the
hands of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The ques-
tion presented concerns the Board's role in accommodating a
statute, whose last major legislative reconsideration took place
nearly a half-century ago, to the business, social, and legal land-
scape of the twenty-first century. This is too large a question for a
little Article. What follows is more a provocation than an effort
at definitive resolution.
The portal of entry is the potential applicability of Section
8(e) of the Act, the prohibition of so-called "hot cargo" contracts
to social clauses agreed to by unions and employers, whereby the
latter commit themselves to contract only with businesses that
observe fair labor standards; in particular, those willing to remain
neutral and non-oppositional, when faced with union organizing.
I will argue that a literal reading of that Section, currently sig-
naled by the Board's General Counsel, is not commanded by the
Act, is out of keeping with the tenor of the times, and would do a
disservice to the Republic.
I. THE CONTEMPORARY LABOR BOARD
The leitmotiv of Otto Kahn-Freund's socio-legal scholarship,
Mark Freedland tells us, was his conviction that "the social and
economic function of a given body of law could be entirely trans-
formed behind a curtain of ostensible legal continuity."' That
conviction drew, rightly or wrongly, from Kahn-Freund's percep-
* AlbertJ. Harno Professor of Law, The University of Illinois College of
Law; General Editor, Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal. This Article is
based upon Is Non-Belligerence Hot Cargo? Thoughts on American Exceptionalism and
Social Partnership to appear in LIBER AMICORUM MANFRED WEISS (Achim Seifert &
Marlene Schmidt eds.) (forthcoming). Permission of the editors is gratefully
acknowledged as are comments on the revision from James Brudney and San-
ford Jacoby.
1. Mark Freedland, Otto Kahn-Freund (1900-1979), inJURIsTS UPROOTED:
GERMAN-SPEAKNG tMIGRIt LAWYERs IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN 299, 305 (Jack
Beatson & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2004).
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tion of the work of the labor courts of Weimar, Germany; but, it
could draw a parallel from observation of the work of the
National Labor Relations Board today.
The NLRB (and the Office of General Counsel), a majority
of whose members are now firmly in the hands of the administra-
tion of Bush-fi/s, have tacitly adopted a policy of curtailing the
extension of collective bargaining.2 There is little legal impedi-
ment for it to pursue that end. Administrative law accords the
2. The Board has, among other things,
" denied the Act's coverage to graduate teaching assistants, Brown Univ.,
342 N.L.R.B. No. 42 (July 13, 2004) (overruling New York Univ., 332
N.L.R.B. 111 (2000)).
" excluded temporary agency workers from bargaining units with the
receiving employer's complement of regular employees making it much
more difficult, if not impossible, to represent them, Oakwood Care Ctr.,
343 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (Nov. 19, 2004) (overruling M.B. Sturgis, 331
N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000)).
" abandoned the presumption accorded under prior law that a supervi-
sor's threat of plant closure in the event of unionization would have
been widely disseminated among the workers, Crown Bolt, Inc., 343
N.L.R.B. No. 86 (Nov. 29, 2004) (overruling Gen. Stencils, Inc., 195
N.L.R.B. 1109 (1972)).
" reversed prior precedent to hold a supervisor's words in support of a
union (and contrary to her employer's anti-union posture) are "inher-
ently coercive" of employee free choice sufficient to set an election aside,
Haborside Healthcare, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 100 (Dec. 8, 2004).
" granted review and so signaled the Board majority's intent to abandon
policy of long standing that gives a union voluntarily (and lawfully) rec-
ognized by an employer as its employees' bargaining agent a reasonable
period of unchallengeable representative status, Dana Corp., 341
N.L.R.B. No. 150 (June 7, 2004).
" granted review and so signaled the majority's intent to exclude airport
security screeners, who are employees of private contractors, from the
Act, Firstline Transp. Sec., Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (June 7, 2004).
In all these decisions, the Board divided along partisan lines. In Firstline, for
example, Member Liebman dissented on the claim that the case was a novel
one insofar as it implicated the relationship of statutory coverage to national
security:
The Board's historical approach has been precisely the opposite,
asserting jurisdiction because, for example, an employer's operations
have a substantial impact on national defense. See Ready Mixed Con-
crete & Materials, Inc., 122 NLRB 318, 320 (1958)....
Similarly, the Board has rejected arguments that it should not
assert jurisdiction over workers employed at nuclear energy plants,
operated under contract with the federal government, on national
security-related grounds. See, e.g., General Electric Co., 89 NLRB 726,
736 (1950). And during the Second World War, the Board exercised
jurisdiction over militarized plant guards, with the Supreme Court's
approval. See NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398 (1947); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416 (1947).
Firstline, 344 N.L.R.B. No. 124, at 2 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
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agency broad discretion in how it chooses to read the Act, and
the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the
Board's "primary responsibility for developing and applying
national labor policy."3 The Board may modify antecedent doc-
trine or abandon it altogether by decisions "interstitial" to the
Act,4 i.e., at the Act's margins, even if it is at the margins where
the law might most importantly be felt in the face of contempo-
rary circumstances. In principle, an agency may not change the
basic focus or function of its organic law, for example, by a deci-
sion that construes a key word of the text,5 but that principle fails
to address the systematic narrowing of the organic law's mission
by a combination of marginal decisions no one of which, taken
only on its own, can be said to lie outside the ambit of adminis-
3. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990)
("This Court has emphasized often that the NLRB has the primary responsibil-
ity for developing and applying national labor policy." (citing Beth Israel Hosp.
v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 236 (1963); NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)). In Beth Israel
Hospital the Court states:
Because it is to the Board that Congress entrusted the task of "apply-
ing the Act's general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite
combinations of events which might be charged as violative of its
terms," that body, if it is to accomplish the task which Congress set of
it, necessarily must have authority to formulate rules tofill the interstices
of the broad statutory provisions.
Beth Israel Hosp., supra, at 500-01 (quoting Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945)). In Curtin Mathensen Scientific, the Court declared:
This Court therefore has accorded Board rules considerable def-
erence. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42
(1987); NLRB v. Iron Workers, 482 U.S. 335, 350 (1978). We will
uphold a Board rule as long as it is rational and consistent with the
Act, Fall River, supra, at 42, even if we would have formulated a differ-
ent rule had we sat on the Board, Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc.
v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 413, 418 (1982). Furthermore, a Board rule is
entitled to deference even if it represents a departure from the
Board's prior policy. See NLRB v. j Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251,
265-66 (1975) ("The use by an administrative agency of the evolu-
tional approach is particularly fitting. To hold that the Board's earlier
decisions froze the development of this important aspect of the
national labor law would misconceive the nature of administrative
decisionmaking.") Accord, Iron Workers, supra, at 351.
Curtin Mathenson, supra, at 786-87 (internal citations abbreviated) (emphasis
added).
4. See Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 798.
5. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218
(1994). Cf Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common
Law, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 429, 495 ("It [the question as seen by Justice Scalia in
the MCIcase] is not merely the largeness of the change being effected, but also
that accepting it will entail accepting that an agency can be empowered to
change its mandate.").
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trative discretion. The appearance of legal continuity is thus
maintained even as the Act's stated purpose, of "encouraging the
practice . . .of collective bargaining, '"6 is transformed.
Philosophy can be fine-spun in a hermit's hut,7 but public
policy cannot be made, not well made, in isolation. Sound labor
policy has to draw sustenance from a thoughtful engagement
with long-term economic, legal, and social trends. In this, the
Labor Board is twice hobbled. First, basic guidance on how the
law should respond to deep-seated change should come from the
legislature: it is equipped, by the creation of commissions of
inquiry, or by the processes of legislative investigation, to inform
itself of how the landscape is changing and of where the law ill
fits. More important, as an elected body it is best situated to
strike a compromise that, if not optimal from an academic's per-
spective, at least maintains social cohesion, i.e., to reach a result
the citizenry would regard as legitimate because of the very
nature of the body and the process. Such, at least, is the teaching
of Civics 101, but in that the legislature has failed miserably.8
The last major legislative recalibration of the Labor Act occurred
in 1959. (The Act was amended thirty years ago, but only to
extend jurisdiction to non-profit health care institutions.) Since
then, every serious effort to fine-tune the law has met with politi-
cal stalemate. This places the Labor Board in the awkward posi-
tion of having to react to a rapidly changing world, guided only
by the text of a statute whose last significant legislative reconsid-
eration is now near a half-century old.
This first conundrum is not of the Board's making, but the
second one is, for nothing prevents the Board from developing
on its own an appreciation of where the world it regulates is
going-what needs are being unmet, what trends are emerg-
ing-and to adapt the law within the limits of its discretion. This
the Board gives no promise of doing. National labor policy, as
fashioned today, draws its sustenance only from the Board major-
ity's ideological pre-disposition and its legitimacy only from the
Board's power.9
6. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
7. See RAY MONK, LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: THE Durn' OF GENIUS 362-63
(1990).
8. See Thomas A. Kochan, A Silver Anniversary Not Worth Celebrating: The
Impasse Over American Labor and Employment Policies, 25 COMp. LAB. L. & POL'vJ.
79 (2003).
9. A nuanced analysis of this situation is provided by James Brudney, Iso-
lated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 27 COMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J.
221(2005), accompanied by a set of comments from various foreign
perspectives.
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It would be foolish to ignore the fact that the Labor Board is
a political body, a fact the draftsmen of the Act knew very well.
In 1935, Philip Levy, a member of Senator Wagner's staff, was
engaged in drafting the Act that was to bear the Senator's name.
Calvert Magruder, on leave from Harvard Law School as General
Counsel of the then (now "old") National Labor Relations
Board, was also engaged at a higher level in the drafting process.
That spring, Levy wrote to Magruder apropos some proposed
changes in the draft:
At the hearings last year there was considerable opposition
on the part of some protagonists of the bill [the proposed
National Labor Relations Act], to giving the [proposed
National Labor Relations] Board the power to certify rep-
resentatives in the absence of an election by secret ballot.
The argument was made that at some future time the
Board might come under the influence of an anti-labor
administration or that it will use its power to freeze out
independent or progressive groups .... We feel that the
argument is unsound; first, it is extremely important that
the Board have the power to certify or to determine repre-
sentation in any manner it sees fit, and secondly, if the
Board is going to be pro-employer, the jig is up.lO
It also follows from Levy's quip that an agency so driven garners
not the public's respect, but its cynicism.
By blinding itself to demonstrable contemporary circum-
stances and needs, the body bids fair to blunder, and in blunder-
ing to ill serve the Republic. A small object lesson in the making
of labor policy is supplied by the General Counsel's proposed
engagement (and so, potentially, the Board's) with the applica-
tion of Section 8(e) to employer-union neutrality agreements.
II. THE CONTEMPORARY DOMESTIC CONTEXT
The future of the American labor movement has moved to
the fore with the withdrawal of three large unions-the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU), the International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters (IBT), and the United Food and Commer-
cial Workers (UFC)-from the American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and their crea-
tion of a Change to Win Coalition. High on the Coalition's
agenda is a reversal in the decades-long decline in union repre-
sentation in the private sector-from well over a third of the eli-
10. Memorandum from Philip Levy to Calvert Magruder (undated) (on
file with the author) (emphasis added).
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gible workforce in the 1950s to just about eight percent today-a
decline which has, among other things, contributed to the
increasing wage inequality the nation has experienced over the
past several decades. Sound survey data suggest that thirty per-
cent of the unrepresented workforce-over twenty million work-
ers-desire union representation. I' The disparity between
representational want and representational reality has been
explained, if only in part, by the effects of active employer oppo-
sition to union organizing, including opposition that may be per-
fectly lawful as a matter of employer free speech sheltered by the
Act.' 2 Even in the 1950s, however, when union density was at its
height, the Act's defects in the face of employer opposition to
unionization were obvious. As Archibald Cox observed at the
time, "The protection against employer interference available
under the NLRA is imperfect, because of the delays and uncer-
tainties of litigation, the manifold opportunities for subtle dis-
crimination, and the coercion exercised through freedom of
expression."'i
In response, an avenue that some unions have found pro-
ductive is the negotiation of neutrality agreements whereby a
company agrees that in the event of a union organizing effort the
company will remain neutral, i.e., non-belligerent: it will leave
the workers, those supportive of as well as antagonistic toward
the union, to sort it out amongst themselves. 14 Because, under
Section 8(a) (2), the Act also forbids an employer to "support" a
labor organization impermissibly, e.g., to favor one union over
another, a neutrality agreement could not be applied one-sidedly
should another labor organization not a party to the neutrality
agreement present itself. And because the Act's basic right to
form or assist a labor organization includes a right to refrain
from organization, the employer could not forbid its workers to
oppose a union's organizing effort, and vigorously. Under these
conditions, more employees may be securing union representa-
tion by voluntary action today than by resort to the Board's
processes. Even as unions may be more successful in organizing
under conditions of neutrality than under conditions of belliger-
11. RICHARD B. FREEMAN &JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT (1999);
see also Symposium, What Do Workers Want: Reflections on the Implications of the
Freeman & Rodgers Study, 3 U. PA.J. LAB. & EMP. L. 375 (2001).
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000).
13. Archibald Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 270 (1959) (emphasis added).
14. The state of the law on the issues presented by neutrality agreements
is thoroughly analyzed byJamesJ. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check
Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REv. 819 (2005).
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ence, however, a substantial number of these organizing efforts
fail. Based on the demonstrated failure of the electoral model
and the normative advantages of employer neutrality, James
Brudney concludes that the latter provides a more level playing
field than that provided under the rules governing NLRB-held
representation elections. 1
5
There is no doubt that a neutrality agreement is lawful. Nev-
ertheless, the Board and the General Counsel are exploring ways
of limiting its use or impact. The Board has announced its intent
to abandon its long-standing policy of affording a voluntarily-rec-
ognized union-one that has support from an employee majority
and which the employer agrees in consequence to bargain
with-a period of time during which its representational status
cannot be contested; a so-called "recognition bar" to an untimely
petition by dissident workers to oust the union.16 On his part,
the General Counsel has issued an instruction requiring central
review of-and so signaling the importance attached to-any
unfair labor practice charge implicating one of three issues
which the General Counsel sees these agreements potentially to
pose.' 7 The first goes hand-in-glove with the Board's announced
reconsideration of its recognition bar doctrine, just discussed.
The second concerns the prohibition of impermissible "support"
to a labor organization, also discussed above. The third concerns
any allegation that "an employer and a union agreed that the
employer would require entities that it owns or does business with to
execute a neutrality agreement."' 8 "It is argued," the General
Counsel opined, "that such agreements are unlawful secondary
agreements under Section 8(e)," the so-called "hot cargo" clause,
to which our attention next turns.
III. THE HOT CARGO CLAUSE
In 1947, in a reaction to a wave of major strikes (in which
workers were seeking to regain purchasing power lost during
war-time wage controls) and to the public perception that organ-
ized labor had become "too" powerful (as a result of the cost and
inconvenience these strikes imposed), Congress amended the
Labor Act to curtail union power by enacting prohibitions on
secondary boycotts. This provision, Section 8(b) (4), made it
unlawful, among other things, for a union to strike or engage in
a concerted refusal to handle goods or perform services with an
15. Id. at 876-77.
16. See Dana Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 150 June 7, 2004).
17. NLRB General Counsel Mem. OM 04-76 (July 29, 2004).
18. Id. (emphasis added).
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object of forcing an employer, one with whom the union had
otherwise no dispute, to cease doing business with another
employer, the one with whom the union had a dispute, though
the text drew no such distinction. In 1958, in the Sand Door
case, 9 the United States Supreme Court held that the presence
of a "will not handle" clause in a collective bargaining agreement
was no defense under Section 8(b) (4) to the conduct of a strike
to enforce it; but the Court found nothing in the Act to vitiate
such an agreement per se or to deprive an employer of the power
to observe it if the employer chose to do so free of coercion.
A boycott voluntarily engaged in by a secondary employer
for his own business reasons, perhaps because the unioni-
zation of other employers will protect his competitive posi-
tion or because he identifies his own interests with those of
his employees and their union, is not covered by the stat-
ute. Likewise, a union is free to approach an employer to
persuade him to engage in a boycott, so long as it refrains
from the specifically prohibited means of coercion
through inducement of employees.
20
The Court's solicitude was for the insulation of the targeted (or
"neutral") employer's freedom of choice: to allow it to engage in
a boycott or not as it saw its interests best to lie.
21
Sand Door was thought to create a legal loophole which Con-
gress addressed the following year. The Senate's version of the
proposed law focused on the literal "hot cargo" situation, i.e., of
collective agreements in the trucking industry that allowed the
Teamsters' Union to refuse to handle non-union and struck
goods.22 The House sought a broader prohibition. The Senate
acceded to the House version with two exceptions not relevant
here. And so Section 8(e) rendered an agreement void irrespec-
tive of the absence of any coercion in securing it. It became an
unfair labor practice for
any labor organization and any employer to enter into any
contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such
employer ... agrees to cease . . . doing business with any
other person, and any contract or agreement entered
19. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters &Joiners of America v. NLRB
(Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
20. Id. at 98-99.
21. See Note, Hot Cargo Clauses: The Scope of Section 8(e), 71 YALE LJ. 158
(1961).
22. Cf Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962)
(discussing the role of the Interstate Commerce Commission in assuring that
common carriers do not impose such restrictions).
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into ... or containing such an agreement shall be to such
extent unenforcible and void ....
The conclusion presumably to be drawn from the General Coun-
sel's memorandum follows accordingly from the "plain meaning"
of the statute: an employer may not agree with a union to make
neutrality a factor in deciding what companies it will do business
with.
The problem with this "plain meaning" approach is that Sec-
tion 8(e) cannot be read, and has not been read, plainly. Nor
has it been read at all in the context of a neutrality clause-more
on that in a moment. Whether it should be applied in this con-
text therefore poses a question of national labor policy in the
resolution of which the text of the Act is of no assistance. That
this is so is explained in the next section.
IV. SECTION 8(e): A PROHIBITION IN SEARCH OF A POLICY
The problematic nature of the prohibition was addressed on
the floor of the House by Representative Thompson, who
pointed to two areas of application where the proposed text was
at once unclear and vexing:
(b) Subcontracting clauses: Companies and unions in
manufacturing industries often agree upon restrictions
upon subcontracting in order to protect the employees
against the loss ofjobs .... These clauses ... have nothing
to do with hot cargo agreements or secondary boycotts.
Yet they appear to be outlawed by the House bill.
(c) Primary boycotts: The House bill makes it unlawful
for an employer ever to accede to a union's request that he
cease doing business with another employer who is failing
to maintain fair labor standards. If the employer acceded,
there would be an implied agreement ....
It would seem that a union ought to be able to ask a
friendly concern to stop dealing with a company which will
not observe fair labor standards.
24
The first was addressed by a sharply divided United States
Supreme Court in 1967. The latter, the issue presented here, has
yet to be addressed.
The first was dealt with by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (2000).
24. 2 NLRB, LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING
AND DIscLOsuRE Acr OF 1959, at 1708 (1985) (remarks of Rep. Thompson).
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NLRB,2 5 concerning an agreement whereby carpenters would
not handle pre-fitted doors; all such work would have to be done
at the work site, which meant that the contractor could not
purchase pre-fitted doors. The majority opinion centered on the
tactical objective of a "do not handle" clause: did it address the
labor relations of the contracting employer, for example, to pre-
serve the work done by its employees? If so, the provision would
not fall afoul of Section 8(e), despite the plain language of the
text. Was the provision "tactically calculated to satisfy union
objectives elsewhere"? If so, it was proscribed. Which is which?
"This," the Court opined, "will not always be a simple test to
apply. But '[hiowever difficult the drawing of lines more nice
than obvious, the statute compels the task." 26 This leaves it to
the Labor Board to cobble together a distinction as best it might
for, as Clyde Summers and Harry Wellington observed, the con-
flicting positions taken by the Justices demonstrated that "Con-
gress had in mind no plainly perceived policy and articulated no
rationalizing principle."
27
Now, into this legal muddle comes the General Counsel's
concern for neutrality agreements whereby a company agrees
with a union that it will require companies it "owns or does busi-
ness with" to remain non-belligerent in the face of a representa-
tion drive.2 8 The General Counsel's legal theory has to be that,
as the promise of non-belligerence does not benefit the con-
tracting employer's employees-is intended, that is, to achieve
the union's organizational objective elsewhere-it is proscribed.
Of course, the ultimate objective of requiring neutrality of a com-
pany the employer controls may well be to facilitate the con-
tracting union's ability to organize those employees; but, because
the employer must treat all would-be representatives equally
under Section 8(a) (2), the "certain effect"2 9 is to create better
25. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
26. Id. at 645 (quoting Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach.
Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961)). For a suggestion of how variable,
and complex, the line-drawing can be see Howard Lesnick,Job Security and Secon-
dary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1000
(1965).
27. CLYDE SUMMERS & HARRY WELLINGTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LABOR LAw 336 (1968).
28. The General Counsel's theory, that imposing neutrality on a company
the contracting employer "owns" would violate the Act has, thus far, come a
cropper. Heartland Industrial Partners, JD(NY)-23-05 (NLRB Div. of Judges
June 16, 2005). Inasmuch as the commitment applied to companies the
employer owned, the ALJ reasoned, it would constitute a commitment to "cease
doing business with" the company itself. Id. at 4.
29. See infra text accompanying note 32.
EMPLOYER NELFTRALITY AND LABOR POLICY
conditions for the exercise of employee free choice for or against
any union that presents itself. Moreover, the objective of requir-
ing neutrality of the employer's contractors may have nothing to
do with the contracting union's organizational objective and eve-
rything to do with creating conditions conducive to the fullest
exercise of freedom of workplace association at the contractor,
here or abroad. In other words, the resolution of Rep. Thomp-
son's second problem turns on what our national labor policy
should be with respect to such an objective.
In deciding that question, guidance can be drawn from one
element that, the United States Supreme Court has told us, is an
indisputable, "overriding policy"-the fostering of labor peace.30
That policy played a critical role in the Court's rejection in 1982
of any distinction between a labor objective and a political objec-
tive in the prohibition of coercion, i.e., of the use of a strike."' In
that case, a longshoring union refused to load or unload cargoes
destined to or coming from the Soviet Union, to protest the Rus-
sian invasion of Afghanistan. The Court stated:
As understandable and even commendable as the ILA's
[International Longshoremen's Association] ultimate
objectives may be, the certain effect of its action is to impose
a heavy burden on neutral employers. And it is just such a
burden, as well as widening of industrial strife, that the sec-
ondary boycott provisions were designed to prevent.
32
The policy disfavoring the widening of industrial strife is of
help by negative implication: a union is forbidden by Section
8(b) (4) to strike (or picket) to secure an employer's promise to
contract only with neutral contractors, and breach of such a con-
tract may not be redressed by that action. That is, nothing in the
ILA decision would disallow an agreement to achieve a social pur-
pose, or "commendable .. .objectives." 3 If we regard the labor
condition the agreement would require to be socially beneficial,
the next question is why an employer should be disallowed con-
tractual autonomy to require it of those it does business with, and
then only when the contract is made with a labor organization.
In other words,just what evil would the extension of Section 8(e)
in this context address?
30. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 794 (1990)
(quoting Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987)).
31. See Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212
(1982).
32. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
33. Id.
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Two policy arguments drawn from extant law could be
essayed in support of the General Counsel's position. First, it has
been argued that a refusal to do business provision embodies the
evil of "top-down" organizing. 4 Second, it could be argued that
such a provision unduly burdens a neutral employer by
enmeshing it in another's labor dispute. Let us take each in
turn.
The law prohibits efforts by employers to force unions on
their employees. That is what "top-down" organizing means. As
Archibald Cox explained, the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932
(which took the federal courts out of labor disputes) was indiffer-
ent to the techniques unions could employ to build organiza-
tions of countervailing power to employers. Employees could
join because they
wished to join, because the employer forced them to join
in order to save his business, or because the power of the
union to deprive them of jobs by shutting down the busi-
ness left no viable alternative ...... "Top-down organizing"
is obviously inconsistent with the NLRA ideal of employee
self-organization without interference by employers. A union's
exertion of economic pressure upon employees may also
be inconsistent with the ideal of freedom of choice.3 5
Top-down organizing was addressed in the 1947 and 1959
amendments: A company's contracting with a union to buy only
from unionized suppliers inevitably pressures would-be suppliers
in turn to pressure their employees for union recognition. 36 But
"top-down" organizing is the diametrical opposite of a promise to
remain neutral in the face of an organizational effort. Neutral-
ity-non-belligerence-affords employees freedom of choice
"without interference by employers." To be sure, the Labor Act
gives the employer a qualified privilege to campaign against
unionization without governmental sanction; but an employer is
not obligated to exercise it. Nor do employees opposed to
unionization have a right to compel their employer to exercise it.
34. See Kentucky Workers Resist 'Top-Down' Organizing, NAT'L RIGHT TO
WORK NEWSL. (Nat'l Right to Work Comm., Springfield, Va.), Sept. 2003, at 3
(challenging neutrality, or as it colorfully puts it, "so-called 'neutrality,"' agree-
ments as a form of "top-down" organizing).
35. Cox, supra note 13, at 263 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
36. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No.
100, 421 U.S. 616, 632 (1975) ("One of the major aims of the 1959 Act was to
limit 'top-down' organizing campaigns, in which unions used economic weap-
ons to force recognition from an employer regardless of the wishes of his
employees."). This Article does not address the antitrust consequences, if any,
of agreements governing employer-contractor conditions.
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Given the substantial body of criticism directed to the role of
employers in resisting unionization, employer neutrality is,
though not a statutory policy, at least a statutorily unobjection-
able policy.
The second argument resting on the "burdening of the neu-
tral" justification in the ILA case, has to take account of the two
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In the first, the Court
sheltered a politically-inspired consumer boycott from legal sanc-
tion distinguishing the "coerced participation in industrial strife"
presented in the ILA case.37 In the second, the Court sheltered
union consumer handbilling and other forms of publicity
directed against the purchaser of construction services, a shop-
ping mall, for its selection of a non-union construction contrac-
tor, i.e., to bring public pressure to bear to persuade it to cease
doing business with the contractor.38
As a result, the law regarding the burdening of neutrals
today is this: (1) a union can use any means short of statutory
coercion-it can leaflet, put ads in the papers, purchase air time,
hold campus and other public rallies, engage in "street thea-
ter" 3-_to call for a boycott of an employer until that employer
ceases doing business with another; (2) an employer lawfully may
accede to the union's request that it cease that business relation-
ship; but, (3) if that accession constitutes an implied agreement
it is of no legal effect-the employer may change its mind at any
time-for the remedy Section 8(e) affords is merely an order
nullifying the agreement; and, even then, (4) nothing forbids the
employer to continue to cease doing business even if the agree-
ment to do so is unenforceable. The statutory evil, then, is
neither the involvement of an ostensibly "neutral" employer in
another's labor dispute, nor even involvement as a result of per-
suasion by a labor organization, but the company's having made
the business judgment that its interests are served by committing
itself to do so for a period of time and only when it makes that
commitment to a labor organization.
37. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982) (quot-
ing NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 617-18
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part)) (emphasis added).
38. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988). On the reception thus far of the NLRB
General Counsel's effort to narrow the application of DeBartolo, see Overstreet
v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 409 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2005) and Kentov v.
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2005).
39. See Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1266.
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James Brudney tells us that employers agree to neutrality
agreements when it is in their interest to do so,40 and it can rea-
sonably be assumed that as much would be said of their suppliers
and contractors. Why Section 8(e) should insulate the employer
from making that decision contractually binding remains to be
seen, for all this provision does, in practical terms, is to allow the
employer to conclude that this contract, unlike other of its busi-
ness agreements, can be escaped. The obvious answer to this
question is that such a "will not deal with" provision, unlike the
terms of other, permissible business deals, is unlawful. But that
answer begs the question.
Furthermore, nothing in Section 8(e) denies enforceability
to an agreement, to contract only with contractors who observe
fair labor standards, when made by an employer with community
groups, churches, campus and human rights organizations, and
like coalitions-unless the coalition includes a labor organiza-
tion. (And in which case, to anticipate the later discussion, it is
arguable that the employer would have made an implied agree-
ment violative under Section 8(e), one it would therefore be free
to escape, as it would not absent the union's participation.)
4'
Thus, the only ground on which the extension of Section 8(e)
rests to proscribe a promise of non-belligerence to be required of
contractors is the unstated assumption that the employer, as a
neutral, must be unencumbered by contract (and only by con-
tract with a union) in continuously calculating the benefits and
risks of requiring such a condition. And this is grounded in turn
on the notion that our overriding policy of industrial peace
would be threatened more by an employer's making an agree-
ment to monitor its suppliers (commonly with provision for
peaceful dispute resolution) than by having it act in response to
an intense but altogether lawful and possibly bitter campaign of
public pressure. This reasoning is difficult to explain, let alone
defend.
The point is that Section 8(e), which has not been given a
literal reading in another setting, need not be given a literal
reading in this one. That it should not becomes obvious once
the policy-maker considers economic, legal, and social develop-
ments in the half-century since Section 8(e) was enacted: the
increasingly tight integration of markets, which places in ques-
tion the automatic assumption of the neutrality (or bystanderly
innocence) of a purchaser of goods or services vis-d-vis the labor
policies of its business partner; the increasing acceptance inter-
40. See Brudney, supra note 14; see also infra text accompanying note 52.
41. But see infra note 64.
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nationally of the right to representation in the workplace as a
fundamental or "core" labor right; and, the consequent growth
of corporate codes and of agreements between unions and
employers whereby employers agree to observe core labor stan-
dards for themselves and their contractors.
V. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: THE SocIAL, LEGAL, AND
ECONOMIC TOPOGRAPHY Firv YEARs ON
A critical change in this period consequent upon the growth
of world trade and the fear of a "race to the bottom" in labor
standards is the increasing and now general acceptance of a set
of internationally recognized fundamental or "core" worker
rights. Since its creation in 1919, the International Labour
Organization (ILO) has addressed labor standards via the pro-
mulgation of conventions (and recommendations), few of which
have been ratified by the United States. But "major upheavals at
the turn of the 1980s"42 placed the matter of labor rights high on
public agendas, including the European Community (EC), the
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD) (whose 1976 Declaration on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises dealt in part with labor rights and
freedom of collective bargaining), the Organization for Security
and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) (formerly the Conference
for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE)), the World
Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United
Nations (U.N.), numerous public and non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), and individual nation-states4" including the
United States, which has connected the grant of trade privileges
to the observation of "internationally recognized worker
rights."44 The activity here (and the literature surrounding it) is
far too rich briefly to recount.45 Suffice it to say, after decades of
42. JEAN-MICHEL SERVAIS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 33
(2005).
43. The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (ECHR) was agreed between the member states of the Council of Europe
in 1950, but it requires enabling legislation to become part of domestic law.
The United Kingdom did not do so until the Human Rights Act of 1998, which
came into force in 2000. How the Act will bear on British law in the workplace
remains to be worked out by the judiciary. For an overview, see generally
HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK 1-18 (K.D. Ewing ed., 2000).
44. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(G); see generally Lance Compa & Jeffrey S.
Vogt, Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences: A 20-Year Review, 22
COMP. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 199 (2001).
45. Some of it is surveyed in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1999) and CONFRONTING GLOBAL-
IZATION: THE QUEST FOR A SOCIAL AGENDA (Roger Blanpain ed., 2005).
2006]
556 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20
growing international attention, these efforts culminated in the
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
in 1998. It declares, inter alia, that,
all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions
in question [e.g., the United States], have an obligation,
arising from the very fact of membership in the Organisa-
tion, to respect, to promote and to realise, in good faith
and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles
concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject
of those conventions namely: freedom of association and
the effective recognition of the right to collective bargain-
ing; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory
labour; the effective abolition of child labour; the elimina-
tion of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation.
46
Although the Declaration's status is promotional, it represents an
international policy consensus strongly supported by the United
States,47 and it calls for action by private actors as well as by
governments.
Apropos the latter, the following year, U.N. Secretary Gen-
eral Kofi Annan called for business leaders, governments,
unions, financial institutions, and civil society organizations
(CSOs) to form a Global Compact to support ten universal social
principles including the four "core" or fundamental rights identi-
fied in the ILO Declaration. The text is noteworthy: of three of
46. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
(June 1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATION
WEB.static-jump?varjlanguage=EN&var-pagename=DECLARATIONTEXT
(emphasis added); see also MULTINATIONAL EwrER RIsEs AND THE SOCIAL CHAL-
LENGES OF THE XXIsT CENTURY- THE ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRIN-
CIPLES AT WORK (Roger Blanpain ed., 2000).
47. The Secretary of Labor addressed the 1998 International Labor Con-
ference on behalf of the United States regarding the purpose of the
Declaration:
[T]o make clear what we know to be true-and to thereby deepen our
will to act in that knowledge. And we need a credible and meaningful
follow-up mechanism to assure that our declaration will be a living
document for the 21st century.
We know that fundamental rights of workers-the freedom of
association, the right of collective bargaining, non-discrimination in
employment, the prohibitions on forced labor and exploitative child
labor-ought be implemented by all nations, and certainly by all who
would claim to be members in good standing of this organization [i.e.,
the United States].
Alexis M. Herman, Address at the International Labor Conference (June 9,
1998), available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/history/hernan/
speeches/980609ah.htm.
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the four core rights the call is to a general audience of all the
above actors-for "the elimination of all forms of forced and
compulsory labor," for "the effective abolition of child labor,"
and for "the elimination of discrimination in respect of employ-
ment and occupation"; but on the fourth, the call is far more
sharply focused: "Businesses should uphold the freedom of associa-
tion and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargain-
ing."" The U.N.'s Global Compact Office states even more
explicitly that companies are expected "to embrace, support and
enact, within their sphere of influence, a set of core values" that
includes the above.49 It follows that domestic law is called upon
to allow business to do just that.
This is not to argue that the Labor Board is necessarily
bound by these international standards5 ° (and, in any event, the
ILO Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention,
which the United States has not ratified, has not been inter-
preted to mandate employer neutrality); nor, even to argue less
strongly, that the NLRB is legally obligated to accommodate
them to the extent national law can be read as compatible with
them. It is to argue that national labor policy cannot be fash-
ioned, not wisely fashioned, in a vacuum; that our labor law has
been placed, in part by the economics of a global economy, in
part by the policies the United States government has adopted in
consequence of it, in a global framework, legally and socially as
well as economically; and that it would be irresponsible for the
Labor Board to make policy uninformed by these developments.
It should follow that where the Labor Act, as in Section 8(e), has
ample flexibility to accommodate those international labor poli-
cies the United States has endorsed, the Act should be read, as a
matter of our own national labor policy, to be in keeping with
them.5' Anything less would amount to public adherence to a
double standard-the homage vice pays to virtue.
48. UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, THE UNITED NATIONS
GLOBAL COMPACT: ADVANCING CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 3 (2005), available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about-the-gc/2.0.2.pdf (emphasis
added).
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. On that possibility, see Edward E. Potter, The Growing Significance of
International Labor Standards on the Global Economy, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REv. 243 (2005).
51. This argument is advanced in a time of legal xenophobia expressed
by some of the nation's political leadership. Matthew W. Finkin, On theJour-
nal's Mission in the Next Quarter Century, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'VJ. 1 (2003).
And even so, no decision of the NLRB "has ever even so much as made passing
mention of, let alone to have placed reliance on" any foreign or international
source. Id. at 4. Contrary to the Board, such open-mindedness has long been a
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Second, and bearing on the compatibility of reading Section
8(e) to be in accordance with recommended business practice, it
should be noted that multinational enterprises have heeded the
call for social responsibility. The primary reaction has been in
the unilateral adoption of corporate codes, so-called "soft law,"
the promulgation of which has surged phenomenally from the
late 1980s.52 Bob Hepple has accounted for this development
thusly:
First, the corporate codes are a response to public pressure
from consumers, investors, trade unions and NGOs. TNCs
[transnational corporations] wish to avoid negative public-
ity-or worse still, organised boycotts.... Secondly, many
managers believe that the benefits of good employment
(and environmental) practices outweigh the costs. Those
costs include monitoring and corrective action. The bene-
fits may be improved employee morale, lower labour turn-
over, fewer accidents, enhanced product quality, and
greater consumer and investor confidence. Thirdly, the
codes can be used to strengthen the power of senior cen-
tral management. This is particularly the case with outsourcing
guidelines which enable central management to dictate the labour
practices of sub-contractors and suppliers as part of a monitor-
ing process which leads to better product quality. Contrac-
tors, too, may welcome a level playing field in the otherwise
cut-throat competition for supply contracts. By complying
with code standards they may be assured of long-term con-
tractual relationships and protect themselves from 'free-
riders.' Corporate social responsibility, says the US Coun-
cil for International Business (USCIB), is 'good business'
helping to maintain 'the competitiveness of companies
over time and in highly diverse parts of the world'.5
Finally, and toward the same end, international union feder-
ations and European-wide works councils have negotiated
"framework agreements" with transnational companies that
embody these principles. A survey of thirty agreements indicates
that twenty-six apply the four core principles to entities which the
company manages, controls, or contracts with.5 4 Some require
feature of the judiciary. Id. at 3. E.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419-20
n.1 (1908).
52. See generally ROGER BLANPAIN & MICHELE COLUCCI, THE GLOBALIZA-
TION OF LABOUR STANDARDS: THE SoFT LAw TRACK (2004).
53. BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 71 (2005) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
54. Framework Agreements Concluded Between Transnational Companies and
Global Union Federations, HAZARD MAGAZINE, http://www.hazards.org/union
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and monitor compliance by contractors; others require "best
efforts" to find contractors willing to follow these principles or
contain an obligation to "encourage" contractors to comply.
Importantly, in nine agreements, employers have adopted neu-
trality (or "will not oppose") requirements as in furtherance of
the obligation to uphold their employees' freedom of collective
bargaining,55 and eight of these expressly extend this require-
ment to their contractors. Two such framework agreements that
have domestic application in the United States are illustrative:
the agreement between Daimler Chrysler and the International
Metalworkers Federation (IMF) provides that, "During organiza-
tion campaigns the company and the executives will remain neu-
tral," and states that the company "expects its suppliers to
incorporate these principles as a basis for relations with" it.
56
The agreement between IKEA and the International Federation
of Building and Wood Workers (IFBWW) provides that,
"Employers [that is, the company and its suppliers and contrac-
tors] shall adopt positive views of the activities of trade unions
and an open attitude toward their organizing efforts."57 These
agreements, have been made because it is to the contracting
companies' and to their contractors' business interests to make
them; and, one might add, they challenge as well the assumption,
fifty years after Section 8(e) was enacted, that, in a world of
intense economic interconnectedness, a purchaser should be
effect/gufagreements.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). The Labor and Employ-
ment Relations Convention's listserv posts a smaller list and there are doubtless
numerous others.
55. Nor are they unique. The Base Code of the Ethical Trading Initiative,
a multi-partite body established in the United Kingdom, provides that: "The
employer adopts an open attitude towards the activities of trade unions and
their organisational activities." ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, THE BASE CODE
(2005), available at http://www.ethicaltrade.org/Z/lib/base/code_en.shtml.
The Union Network International (UNI), a global alliance of nine-hundred
unions in one-hundred fifty countries, has negotiated nine framework agree-
ments since 2000 and is negotiating several more, e.g., with Deutsche Telecom
and Deutche Post. Michael Bologna, International Union Close to Agreement on
Organizing Deutche Telekom Subsidiaries, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 165, at A-il
(Aug. 26, 2005). The latter would govern T-Mobile and DHL in the United
States.
56. DAIMLERCHRYSLER & THE DC WORLD EMPLOYEE COMMITTEE ON
BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL METALWORKERS FEDERATION (IMF), SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY PRINCIPLES OF DAIMLERCHRYSLER 2, 3 (2002), available at http://
www.imfmetal.org/main/files/DC%20code%20in%2OEnglish.pdf.
57. AGREEMENT BETWEEN IKEA INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FEDER-
ATION OF BUILDING AND WOOD WORKERS (IFBWW) WOOD AND FORESTRY COM-
MITrEE app. 1 (1998), available at http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/
global/ilo/guide/ifbww.htm.
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considered a moral naif, "neutral" to the labor practices of those
it purchases from.
In 1965, Howard Lesnick lamented the poverty of U.S. labor
policy: "The pressures created by momentous problems," then of
adjustment to technological change, "are contained or released
by no more sensitive a legal instrument than a legislative determi-
nation to protect neutrals from being drawn into the disputes of
others."58 "Those who administer the act," he thought, should
be called upon to "refashion that instrument to serve weightier
purposes. '59 The call to those who administer the act echoes
more insistently anew.
VI. A CONCLUDING OBSERVATION
Section 8 (e) is a child of its time: Congress was not alone in
being concerned about excessive union power at a time when
union power was at its apogee,6" of union aggrandizement and
"top-down organizing" by the use of secondary boycotts. These
tactics were paradigmatic embodiments of the American model
of "business," "bread and butter," or "pure and simple" union-
ism. 61 Agreements grounded in social purposes that transcend
immediate self-seeking do not fit this model. Whence the second
of Thompson's questions: May a company and a union agree not
that the company will deal only with unionized suppliers, but
with suppliers who observe generally recognized fair labor stan-
dards? The objective is "elsewhere," to use National Woodwork tax-
onomy, but is it impermissible? May not a union and a company
agree that the company will not deal with contractors who
exploit child labor?
No case presents itself because American unions, tradition-
ally committed primarily to business unionism, did not seek such
agreements. But now, at a time when the statutory promise of
employee representation remains just that, an unfulfilled prom-
ise, American unions are exploring alternative modalities includ-
ing, Hoyt Wheeler tells us, variations on models of reformist and
social democratic unionism common in Western Europe. This
form of unionism aims at "improving the lives of all those human
beings who produce goods and services, insuring that they will
58. Lesnick, supra note 26, at 1041.
59. Id.
60. E.g., Symposium, Labor Union Power and the Public Interest, 35 NOTRE
DAME L. 591 (1960).
61. HoVT N. WHEELER, THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
19-20 (2002).
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receive the full fruits of their labor. '6 2 Reformist or social demo-
cratic unions seek to make common cause with community,
church, student, and other groups;6" they use collective bargain-
ing as one, but only one, means of achieving these ends. Note
that the presence of a collective bargaining relationship with an
employer is not a pre-condition of negotiating a neutrality agree-
ment, binding the employer regarding its contractors, any more
than were the agreement to be made by a broad-based commu-
nity coalition.
Eight American unions are affiliated with the IMF, four with
the IFBWW. Consequently, it may well be that the Daimler
Chrysler and IKEA framework agreements (among others) made
with these (and other) international union federations have
"impliedly" been made with a U.S. labor organization. If so, and
if the Labor Board were to pursue the General Counsel's
approach, the result would be this: these agreements can con-
tinue to govern Daimler Chrysler's, IKEA's, and the others' con-
tracting abroad, for the Labor Act has no extraterritorial
application.6 4 So too, absent these U.S. unions' affiliations, these
agreements could have effect here, and for the same reason.
65
But once an agreement can be implied between a U.S. union and
an employer in the U.S. containing social clauses governing
whom it will contract with here, Section 8(e) would nullify it.
Consequently, it would be permissible for social democratic
unions in Europe to export their ideals here, better to realize
fundamental labor rights (which the United States has endorsed)
and our law's unrealized promise of workplace representation;
but it would be unlawful for domestic unions to import them.
Almost invariably, Section 8(e) is invoked by an employer
seeking to free itself of an unwanted agreement. Inasmuch as
these global framework agreements have been made willingly,
62. Id. at 21-22. Even at the height of union power, Derek Bok andJohn
Dunlop urged American unions to make "an effort at the grass-roots level to
work with other groups in resolving community problems." DEREK C. BOK &
JOHN T. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 468 (1970). For a more
radical contemporary argument, see DAN CLAWSON, THE NEXT UPSURGE: LABOR
AND THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2003).
63. See, e.g., Michael Bologna, Attorney Warns Activism is Replacing NLRB
Process in Unionizing Drives, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 152, at C-3 (Aug. 9, 2005)
(reporting that to secure neutrality agreements, unions are "building coalitions
with non-union groups such as civil rights organizations, churches, and environ-
mental groups to pressure employers" as well as other more public tactics).
64. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. NLRB, 365 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2004).
65. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 56 F.3d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(secondary boycott ordered by Japanese union having effect in the United
States is not governed by U.S. law).
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accompanied by publicity attesting to the corporation's social
responsibility, one would not expect them to be challenged that
way. But the Board's unfair labor practice power is triggered by
the complaint of any person: there need be no showing of any
adverse effect on the charging party; any person or ideological
interest group is free to file a charge.66 Inasmuch as an employer
who willingly entered upon such an agreement and who is made
an unwilling object of such a charge is free nevertheless to con-
tinue of its own volition to abide by the agreement's legally unen-
forceable terms, one has to inquire what earthly purpose would
be served by the General Counsel's expenditure of effort and the
public's funds to nullify these social clauses.
The most likely practical effect would be to cast a pall of
unlawfulness over them, giving legal color to those domestic
companies uncertain about assuming the responsibility of moni-
toring their contractors. A further effect might make church,
community, student, and other groups chary of cooperating with
unions in pursuit of core labor rights, and, by dividing unions
from these coalitions, to dampen the growth of reformist or
social democratic unionism, if only in seeking corporate social
clauses.67 To that perhaps limited extent, Philip Levy's quip that
the Board would have the power to freeze progressive groups out
of the workplace will have proven prescient.
66. One of the charging parties in the Heartland Industrial Partners case,
supra note 28, was the National Right to Work Legal Foundation.
67. It is possible that such an agreement could continue once the union
was severed as a party to it; but that would only emphasize the cleavage.
